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In this essay, we describe some important themes in energy and environmental 
policy. There are two main reasons for our interest in these policies. First, such policies 
will likely be important in the coming decades as issues related to climate change and 
energy security come to the fore. Second, there are important lessons to be learned from a 
careful review of the actual performance of energy and environmental policies. We 
undertake a selective survey of the literature to highlight what is known about the 
efficiency of particular kinds of policies, laws and regulations in these areas.  
There are three key contributions of this paper. The first is to synthesize a large 
literature on energy and environmental policy in a way that can be easily digested by both 
non-experts and experts. The second contribution is to suggest that, if history is a guide, 
then we should not expect many interventions in these policy areas to come close to 
maximizing net economic benefits. The third is to suggest what might be needed for the 
development of more efficient energy and environmental policies. 
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In this essay, we characterize some important themes in energy and environmental 
policy. As economists we are particularly interested in the relative effectiveness and 
efficiency of various polices: that is, whether a specific policy meets its intended goals, 
and whether that policy is likely to do more good than harm when important impacts, 
such as those related to the environment, health, safety, or energy security, are taken into 
account. 
There are two main reasons for our interest in energy and environmental policies. 
First, we believe such policies will be critically important in the coming decades as issues 
related to climate change and energy security come to the fore. Second, we believe there 
are important lessons to be learned from a careful review of the actual performance of 
energy and environmental policies. 
Our focus will be on recent empirical studies of energy and environmental 
policies. We undertake a selective survey of the literature to highlight what is known 
about the efficiency of particular kinds of policies, laws and regulatory interventions in 
the area of the environment and energy. Efficiency is defined in conventional economic 
terms to represent the impact on consumers and producers (i.e., the sum of consumer and 
producer surplus). 
We will examine cases of both “market failure” and “government failure.” A 
market failure can arise if there are externalities, such as pollution; or if  there are 
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inefficiencies associated with market structure, such as a cartel. A government failure can 
arise if the government selects a policy, such as subsidizing energy, which leads to an 
inefficient outcome. In certain cases, this outcome may actually reduce overall economic 
efficiency compared with the status quo. Government failures may arise for a number of 
reasons. For example, politicians or regulators may simply not have an incentive to 
pursue efficient policies. In addition, regulators may lack adequate information. Both 
market failures and government failures can contribute to the inefficient use of energy 
and environmental resources if they are not rectified. 
Our empirical analysis does not focus on the impacts of policies on specific 
groups of consumers or businesses. While we believe such equity concerns are important, 
an empirical examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. We do, 
however, address the relationship between equity and efficiency when we examine how 
to make policies more efficient. 
There are three key contributions of this paper. The first is to synthesize a large 
literature on energy and environmental policy in a way that can be easily digested by both 
non-experts and experts. To that end, our review of the empirical literature makes liberal 
use of figures and graphs to present key arguments. The second contribution is to suggest 
that, if history is any guide, then we should not expect future interventions in these policy 
areas to maximize net economic benefits. The third is to suggest what might be needed 
for the development of energy and environmental policies that increase net benefits, or 
economic efficiency. Throughout the paper, we consider how our general observations 
apply to climate change policy. 
The findings of the paper can be summarized briefly. In many cases, energy and 
environmental policy increase efficiency in the sense that a particular policy intervention 
does more economic good than harm. In many cases, however, they do not. Furthermore, 
many energy and environmental policies fail to come close to maximizing net economic 
benefits. After developing these arguments, we explore how one might actually improve 
the efficiency of energy and environmental policy. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a synthesis of the empirical 
literature on energy and environmental policy. Section 3 reviews some key issues in 3 
 
political economy related to developing and implementing more efficient policy. Finally, 
section 4 concludes and suggests areas for future research. 
2. An Empirical Review of Energy and Environmental Policy 
In this section, we provide a selective review of energy and environmental policy. 
The review focuses on the economic efficiency of particular policies. The primary market 
failure that is addressed relates to pollution, though we also consider other possible 
externalities associated with traffic congestion and safety. We do not explicitly consider 
the cause of government failures in this section, though we do illustrate that many 
government interventions are economically inefficient. In section 3, we suggest some 
approaches for making policies more efficient and reducing the extent of government 
failures. 
We  wish to provide  an overview  of  important themes  that emerge from an 
analysis of energy and environmental policies. To this end, we systematically reviewed 
articles in the following publications from the year 2000  to July 2009: American 
Economic Review, Energy Economics, Environmental and Resource Economics, Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management, Journal of Economic Perspectives and 
Resource and Energy Economics. We examined titles and abstracts that appeared to be 
relevant to environmental and energy policy, and selected those we thought most 
relevant. In addition, we reviewed other scholarship and government publications in areas 
that we thought were important, including key review articles and citations to those 
articles. We undoubtedly left out some important work in doing this search. Nonetheless, 
we hope to have captured many (if not most) of the important economic themes that are 
presented in the literature.
2
A. Efficiency of Regulations and Laws 
 
There is a great deal of work on the relative efficiency of regulations and laws in 
the United States, and some work on other regions (Guasch and Hahn, 1999). This work 
suggests that many regulations pass a benefit-cost test, but many do not. In addition, there 
is significant room for improving economic efficiency of both laws and regulations.  
                                                 
2 When sources specified the year dollars that were used, we note that here. In cases where we could not 
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Figure 1 provides an overview of the annual costs and benefits of 93  major 
regulations as defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for federal 
rules from 1997 through 2007. To be included in OMB’s report, a regulation had to 
generate costs or benefits of at least $100 million in any one year, and a substantial 
portion of its benefits and costs had to be quantified and monetized. All estimates are 
based on an agency’s analysis before the regulation in question was issued (OMB, 2008). 
While benefit-cost analysis applied to major regulations is often subject to great 
uncertainties, we nevertheless believe that important lessons can be drawn about the 
efficiency of regulation from reviewing the data. 
Following the OMB, we report a range of costs and a range of benefits for each 
agency or department. The key point to be gleaned from the figure is that, at least by 
OMB’s reckoning, each agency passed regulations whose total benefits are likely to have 
exceeded their total costs, except one–the Department of Agriculture. This can be seen in 
the figure by noting that the range of benefits is generally above the range of costs for all 
agencies except one.
3
The finding that most agencies examined by OMB are intervening in ways that 
produce net benefits does not imply that every regulation passed by an agency is likely to 
result in positive net benefits. It does suggest, however, that government intervention has 
had some salutary effects based on these numbers, a point noted by several scholars 
(Sunstein, 2002; Graham, 2008). 
 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency looks particularly good 
using  this assessment, primarily because of the expected benefits attributable to 
particulate matter reduction.  
The OMB analysis is consistent with a study by Hahn that suggests that the net 
benefits of federal regulation from 1981 to 1996 are positive (Hahn, 2000). Hahn argues 
that the government can increase the net benefits of regulation substantially, because less 
than half the rules he examined would likely pass a benefit-cost test based on quantified 
benefits and costs. He also notes that just two rules in his sample–the Department of 
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for the Department of Agriculture, the net benefits of regulation for this agency would be negative. Even 
for this agency, the net benefits could be positive if costs were at the low end of the range and benefits were 
at the high end of the range. 5 
 
Transportation’s automatic restraints in cars and the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
lead phasedown in gasoline–account for more than half of the total net benefits of 
regulation. 
OMB’s analysis has many deficiencies, as do other analyses based on similar 
data. Some of these were highlighted in its report. One is that the study relies on analysis 
done before a regulation is passed. The picture of gains and losses from a regulation or 
regulatory program frequently look very different before the fact and after the fact 
(Winston, 1998; Harrington  et al., 2000). A second is that there is a great deal of 
uncertainty in the underlying estimates, and related to that, some aspects of benefits and 
costs are very difficult to quantify. 
There has been some work on environmental and energy laws and programs, and 
the picture for net benefits is mixed. For example, using EPA estimates, Freeman (2002) 
suggests that proposed standards for particulate matter would have resulted in significant 
net benefits, but proposed standards for controlling ground-level ozone would have 
resulted in net costs. Portney (1990) argues that the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
would likely have many programs that result in positive net economic benefits, including 
the introduction of allowance trading for reducing sulfur dioxide emissions. In some 
cases, such as the regulations of toxic substances, they argue that the law would likely 
impose more costs than benefits. Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that the net 
benefits of the program to control air pollution are higher than those for controlling water 
pollution. Indeed the net benefits associated with water pollution control may be negative 
(Freeman III, 2002).  
In addition to research that reviews the overall net benefits of laws and 
regulations, some scholarship examines the detailed patterns emerging from studying 
specific regulations. Hahn et al. (2000) study the mortality implications of regulatory 
costs imposed by 24 federal regulations. They investigate whether those regulations are 
likely to have the unintended effect of increasing mortality risk. This risk could increase, 
for example, if the resources available for direct expenditures on health were 
substantially reduced as a result of the increased costs of a particular regulation. The 
authors find that an unintended increase in total risk is likely to occur for the majority of 6 
 
regulations they examine. At the same time, aggregate mortality risk falls for those 
regulations, in large part because a few regulations yield large reductions in risk. The 
authors find that, of the 24 rules they examine, more than half (15) would fail a benefit 
cost-test. Moreover, a substantial number would likely result in increases in mortality as a 
result of the tradeoff between reduced income and increased mortality. Even if one is 
skeptical of the association between income and mortality, this work suggests that many 
U.S. federal regulations in the environmental area not likely to pass a benefit-cost test. 
One of the longer time series aimed at addressing the effectiveness of regulations 
was developed by Morrall to evaluate environmental, health, and safety regulation. 
Figure 3 plots data on the cost per statistical life saved–a measure of how effective a 
regulation is at extending the life-span of the affected population (Morrall, 2003). For 
regulations aimed primarily at extending life, this measure closely tracks conventional 
economic efficiency measures. 
Figure  2  covers 79 final regulations, broken down into three categories: 
regulations aimed at improving safety (“safety”); regulations aimed primarily at reducing 
cancer (“toxin control”); and a miscellaneous category labeled “other.” Two key trends 
are evident from the data. First, the toxin control regulations appear to cost more at the 
margin than do safety regulations for each statistical life saved (Tengs et al., 1995). 
Second, there is substantial variation within and across both the safety and the toxin 
control categories (Tengs et al., 1995; Morrall, 2003). The cost per statistical life saved 
ranges from $100,000 to $100 billion (in 2002 dollars). For example, the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission’s 1993 rule for childproof lighters only costs $100,000 per 
statistical life saved, while the Environmental Protection Agency’s 1991 solid waste 
disposal rule costs over $100 billion per statistical life saved. In addition, the variation in 
the cost per statistical life saved increases significantly in the 19 years after 1986 
compared with the 19 years before 1986, suggesting that there may now be greater 
potential gains in reallocating resources across life-saving investments  (Hahn and 
Tetlock, 2008).  In particular, there appear to be ample opportunities  for refocusing 
regulations away from those with a high cost per statistical life saved and toward those 
with a low cost per statistical life saved. The result would be that regulation could either 
save more lives, or reduce expenditures, or both (Tengs and Graham, 1996). Similar 7 
 
results for the cost per statistical life saved over various regulations have been found in 
studies looking at Japan (Kishimoto et al., 2003) and Sweden (Ramsberg and Sjöberg, 
1997). 
Winston (2006) provides a careful and comprehensive analysis of the empirical 
evidence on the economic impact of government policies to correct market failures in the 
United States. He finds that government interventions frequently occur when no 
significant market failure exists. In addition, many policies aimed at addressing market 
failures could have corrected them at significantly lower cost. In reviewing the welfare 
costs of market failure, Winston notes several cases where there are substantial 
inefficiencies. Examples include inefficient pricing and investment in highways, airports, 
and public transit.
4
B. Economic Instruments 
 The fact that such infrastructure investments tend to be inefficient 
may have important implications for climate change policy, where infrastructure plays an 
important role in both reducing emissions and adapting to the problem.  
Economists  have suggested that regulating environmental pollution with 
“economic instruments” can lead to significant cost savings compared with so-called 
“command and control” approaches. Here, we provide a brief review of the empirical 
literature, focusing on important applications, such as the market-based approach for 
reducing sulfur dioxide in the United States.
5
                                                 
4 Annual deadweight losses of about $24 billion, $18 billion and $9 billion respectively (see Winston, 2006, 
p. 74). 
 We find that market-based approaches for 
meeting environmental targets have generally resulted in cost savings. We also find that 
these approaches could be designed to improve economic efficiency in a number of ways, 
including choosing a target that carefully balances economic benefits and costs, designing 
an economic approach that more closely links firm behavior to actual economic damages, 
and having the government spend revenues that may accrue from a particular regulatory 
approach more efficiently. 
5 For a comprehensive overview of existing market based policies see Stavins (2003). We do not discuss 
specific applications of pollution taxes. For a collection of ex-post studies of pollution taxes see Muller and 
Sterner (2006).  8 
 
Two prime examples of market-based approaches discussed in the literature are 
taxes and marketable permits. Taxes typically limit pollution by forcing the polluter to 
pay a unit tax on emissions. If the tax is the same for everyone, then each polluter sets the 
unit tax equal to the marginal cost of emissions and this theoretically leads to emissions 
being reduced at minimum cost. The idea behind marketable permits is similar. Each 
polluter must have permits to cover the amount of emissions she emits. So for example, if 
a polluter emits 30 pounds of pollution, she might need 30 permits. The overall level of 
permits is set by the government. They can then be bought or sold freely in the 
marketplace. In a well-functioning market, emitters have an incentive to emit up to the 
point where the marginal cost of reducing emissions equals the price of a permit, again 
leading to a least cost solution. 
In theory, if one is interested in maximizing economic benefits, the tax should be 
set so as to equate the marginal benefits and costs of pollution. Similarly, if one is using a 
quantity-based instrument, such as a marketable permits, the overall quantity should be 
set so as to equate the marginal benefits and costs of pollution.
6




The benchmark used to evaluate a market-based approach is typically a 
command-and-control regime that often involves technological requirements that the 
regulator might impose to achieve a similar environmental objective. Not surprisingly, 
economists find most market-based approaches have the potential to produce cost 
savings.  
 The general finding is that they have the potential to both reduce overall 
control costs and/or improve environmental quality (Baumol and Oates, 1988). In 
practice, however, they frequently fall short of their potential. 
Tietenberg provided an early review of studies of potential cost savings from 
marketable permit systems, which he recently updated (Tietenberg, 2006). Figure 3 
summarizes simulation studies that compare command-and-control approaches with 
marketable permit regimes. The studies suggest that the range of potential cost savings is 
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large-scale applications of this instrument.  9 
 
large. Most of the studies predict cost savings above 40% by moving to marketable 
permits from an existing command and control approach, and some predict cost savings 
above 90%.  
A number of authors have provided ex-post estimates–that is, estimates after the 
event–of  the actual impact of introducing marketable permit systems. An early ex-post 
analysis by Hahn and Hester (1989) on an EPA emission trading system for air pollutants 
suggested that there were cost savings between $1 and 12 billion through 1985, with little 
change in environmental quality. EPA’s original ex-ante estimate–that is, an estimate 
done before the event–of cost savings from the lead trading program was $200 million 
between 1985 and 1987 relative to a command-and-control based system that would have 
achieved similar environmental results (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1985, pp. 
E-3). Actual cost savings may have been much higher, given that observed banking was 
higher than the EPA study suggested. 
The flagship U.S. SO2  allowance trading regime, which cut nationwide SO2 
emissions in the U.S. by 50 percent below 1980 levels by 2000 (Stavins, 1998, p. 70), has 
been studied extensively. Here, we focus on ex-post studies because they are based on 
actual data from the performance of the market (see Table 1).
8 Early studies of the SO2 
trading program  based on data from the first two years of trading  were somewhat 
ambiguous on estimated cost-savings. Carlson et al. (2000) found that costs under the 
trading system were actually higher in the first two periods than they would have been 
under prescriptive regulation
9
Keohane (2006) examined the entire first phase of trading from 1995-1999. His 
study improves upon previous studies by using data for five years rather than two. He 
employs an econometric model of abatement choice actually made by utilities to estimate 
behavior under prescriptive regulation, whereas previous studies used engineering 
. Ellerman et al. (2000) estimated $358 million per year in 
cost savings. 
                                                 
8 The relationship between ex ante and ex post studies is not always clear. See discussion in Hahn and 
Tetlock (2008) and Harrington, Morgenstern et al. (2000). 
9 Carlson et al. (2000) offer two explanations for this surprising result twofold. First, their model does not 
account for short-term adjustment costs. Second, they argue that little trading occurred in the first two years 
of the program because utilities were not used to managing allowances and because it takes time to 
establish a functioning market. They observe that in later periods trading volume grew, both between firms 
as well as within firms across different facilities. 10 
 
estimates or least-cost algorithms to estimate the counterfactual baseline. Keohane found 
annual abatement cost savings of $150-$180 million, corresponding to cost savings of 
17%-20% relative to a regime with performance standards. In a different analysis, he 
estimates that a technology standard requiring scrubbers would have been 3.5 times more 
expensive than the market outcome. 
The European Trading System (ETS) for CO2  emissions is another major 
application of a pollution permit trading market, at least in aspiration if not in actual 
performance during the early years. It started in 2005 with a three year trial period that 
was not linked to later trading periods, and since 2008 the regular operation of this 
market has started. The trial period was characterized by high volatility of permit prices 
and a complete collapse of the permit price in the year 2007, leading to speculation by 
some observers that too many permits might have been allocated to firms so that no 
emission reduction at all was achieved.  
A series of ex-post studies of the first period of the EU ETS found that there were 
emission reductions, but they were not large (see Table 1). For example Ellerman and 
Buchner (2008) estimated that there were emission reductions in the range of 50-100 
Mton CO2 per year. Other studies confirm that the EU ETS had a positive  impact on 
reducing emissions; however, the magnitude of reductions is very small compared to 
worldwide CO2 emissions due to human activity of about 28 Gton CO2 in 2006.  
The reductions also fall short of the ambitious targets often discussed by 
politicians  (Helm, 2009). Compared to the U.S. SO2  trading program that had a 
significant impact on environmental quality, the EU ETS so far has delivered  very 
modest changes in environmental quality. At the same time it is worth stressing that this 
is not a failure of the instrument itself, but rather a result of the very modest goals that 
policy makers achieved during the first period of the EU ETS. It is  not possible to 
compare EU ETS cost savings with other market-based regimes because we have not 
been able to find published estimates of these savings. This would be a useful area for 
future research as the ETS program evolves. 
Based on the gap between the theory and practice of implementing marketable 
permit regimes, there are several ways in which their cost-effectiveness and efficiency 11 
 
could be enhanced.  Within the current approach to regulation, we consider two possible 
efficiency enhancements. The first is to expand the scope of trading and the second is to 
eliminate constraints that do not help achieve the environmental target.
10
Both the SO2 allowance trading regime and the EU ETS placed restrictions on 
their scope that led to unnecessary increases in the cost of achieving the environmental 
objective. The SO2  allowance trading regime targeted electric utilities, and did not 
include industrial sources of sulfur dioxide, which were regulated separately. The EU-
ETS covered a little less than half of total European CO2 emissions, including power 
plants and five major industrial sources. Some important sectors, such as transport and 
housing, were not included. No attempt was made to reduce overall costs of the policy by 
equalizing marginal abatement costs across sectors that were covered by the EU ETS and 
sectors that were not (Tol, 2009) 
 
In addition, both the SO2 market and the EU ETS market were implemented in the 
presence of other regulations that made the systems unnecessarily costly. In the case of 
the  SO2  allowance trading market, regulations that required new power plants to be 
cleaner than existing power plants were maintained. As discussed below, there are 
political forces that frequently work to discriminate against new sources in this way. 
However,  there is little, if any, justification for such additional regulation when an 
economic instrument already limits the overall amount of pollution to a specified level.  
In the EU ETS there were also several regulations that had no effect on reaching 
the environmental goal, though they may have had some salutary effects on reducing 
energy consumption of fossil fuels. These included the European Commission’s goal of a 
20 percent share of renewable energy sources as well as the target of an improvement in 
energy efficiency of 20 percent. The setting of these multiple targets does not appear to 
be justified on economic grounds (Helm, 2009). One example is the requirement placed 
on utilities in Germany to buy all electricity generated by renewable energy sources at 
prices set by the government.  The government-set prices are substantially higher than the 
market price for electricity, and differ for different kinds of renewable energy. For 
example solar generated power fetches a higher price than wind power (Frondel et al., 
                                                 
10 See the discussion below in Section 3 for why politics may make it difficult to remove such constraints. 12 
 
2008). The subsidies for different kinds of power do nothing to reduce directly the 
quantity of CO2 emissions because this is limited by the EU ETS. Thus, one must weigh 
any remaining social benefits of subsidizing these sources of power against the costs.
11
There are two other key areas for design improvements that researchers have 
highlighted, but have yet to be translated into environmental policy design effectively. 
One is to tie the design of an economic instrument more closely to economic damages. 
The second is to use revenues that may result from implementing an economic instrument 
in ways that yields even greater efficiencies–such as by cutting taxes that are particularly 
inefficient or investing in promising research and development. 
 
The idea of balancing overall costs and benefits in designing economic 
instruments has been around for some time. In general, however,  considerations of 
quantitative marginal damages have played little role in the actual design of permit 
markets.  Montgomery  (1972)  points out the need to consider multiple markets if an 
emissions source has different effects on different areas.  
Only recently has there been empirical work assessing the potential gain from 
including the marginal damages associated with different emission sources in a market-
based system. Muller and Mendelsohn define damages of SO2  emissions to include 
“premature mortalities, cases of illness, reduced timber and crops  yields, enhanced 
depreciation of man-made materials, reduced visibility, and recreation usage.” (Muller 
and Mendelsohn, forthcoming, p. 16). They consider the possibility of a trading system 
that reflects spatially-variant damages from different sources. Under this approach, 
damage-weighted trading ratios would be introduced that require sources that cause 
higher damages to hold more permits per unit of emissions than sources that cause lower 
damages.
12
                                                 
11 Note that in principle there might be other market failures, such as to economies of scale or learning by 
doing, that could justify some transitory support for new technologies.  
 The authors find that if the level of SO2 emissions were kept constant, but 
permit requirements  per source were adjusted by their  marginal  damages,  additional 
annual net benefits of $300 to $900 million (in 2000 dollars) could be realized (Muller 
and Mendelsohn, forthcoming, p. 25). These cost savings are similar in magnitude to the 
cost savings estimated from introducing the marketable permit system instead of a 
12 Spatially differentiated emission taxes could yield similar results. 13 
 
command-and-control regulation (see Table 1). The authors also estimated that if the total 
cap were adjusted  from 10.2 million tons of SO2  to roughly 1 million tons,  so that 
marginal abatement would equal marginal damages at each source, additional annual net 
benefits of $7 to 9 billion USD over the current system could be realized (Muller and 
Mendelsohn, forthcoming, p. 25). This example clearly illustrates that there are efficiency 
gains that could be achieved by selecting a more efficient target as well as achieving a 
particular target in a least cost fashion. 
Climate change offers an important example of how making better use of some of 
the design principles discussed above can lead to substantial increases in efficiency. From 
an efficiency perspective, the world as a whole is doing too little to reduce net CO2 
emissions. Most of the world’s countries are doing little or nothing to limit CO2 
emissions, yet almost all economic studies find significant marginal damages from 
emitting CO2 into the atmosphere. Nordhaus’ latest estimate finds a social cost of carbon 
of $27/tC (Nordhaus, 2008, p. 15) and a meta study of social cost of carbon estimates by 
Tol (2008) finds a social cost of carbon of $20/tC.
13 
14
Obstacles to implementing an efficient global policy on climate change are more 
significant than in a national context because of problems with free-riding and an uneven 
distribution of benefits and costs across countries.
 
15
                                                 
13 Tol uses fairly conservative assumptions about discounting. He also uses no distributional weights that 
would give more weight, say, to impacts in regions with low income. If these assumptions are relaxed, 
uncertainty over the appropriate social cost of carbon increases, as does a reasonable upper bound for this 
estimate. 
 The one attempt at a global treaty on 
climate change with quantitative emission limits fared poorly in economic and 
environmental terms. Kyoto will most likely fail  to achieve any significant emission 
reductions, largely because it did not include major CO2 emitting countries, such as the 
US, India and China. Countries that will meet their targets in many cases will do so 
because they were able to buy “hot air” allowances from the former Soviet and Eastern 
14 We ignore the contentious debate about the results of the Stern Review on climate change here. Even the 
conservative estimates of economic damages cited above would warrant more stringent action than is 
currently being taken. 
15 A large literature on the likelihood of a global agreement on climate change has suggested that an 




Another important area where there may be significant efficiency gains is through 
judicious spending of revenues that may be generated by economic instruments. A 
marketable permit program can raise revenue by auctioning off some or all of the 
allowances. A tax program raises revenues directly. Several scholars have noted the 
efficiency properties of raising revenues if the money is spent wisely–say, to reduce other 
distorting taxes. For example, Parry et al. (1999) examine the costs of achieving different 
carbon emission reduction goals via a carbon tax (or auctioned marketable permits) 
where revenues are used to cut distorting labor tax rates. They compare this approach 
with achieving the same emission reductions via a carbon quota or grandfathered carbon 
permits with no adjustment to distorting labor taxes. They estimate that for a 5% 
reduction in emissions, a quota with no tax adjustment is almost 6 times as costly as a 
regulation that cuts distorting taxes, and for a 15 % reduction costs are 2.6 times higher 
for the carbon quotas (or grandfathered permits).  
  An economic assessment of the original Kyoto proposal by 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) suggested why the U.S. may not have elected to ratify the 
protocol. It would have borne the majority of mitigation costs, but not enjoy a 
comparable level of benefits, even when the interests of future U.S. citizens were taken 
into account.  
Unfortunately, the revenues that accrue from taxation and marketable permits are 
not always spent with the objective of increasing overall economic welfare.
17  Hahn 
(2009) reviews the evidence related to greenhouse gas auctions and taxes, and notes that 
at least some of the revenues are not likely to have been spent wisely from a narrow 
efficiency perspective. Furthermore, given political pressures, he suggests that it is not 
reasonable to presume that revenues from the application of new market-based 
approaches for environmental protection will be driven by concerns with maximizing 
economic efficiency.
18
                                                 
16 Some countries received more allowances allocated than they needed to cover their total emissions. 
When they sell these excess allowances, they will not have to reduce emissions because the allowances 
were not needed in the first place. Such allowances are often referred to as “hot air” allowances. 
 This phenomenon of using revenues inefficiently is not limited to 
revenues from environmental taxation or regulation. Becker and Mulligan (2003) find 
17 See discussion below. 
18 Given current budgetary pressures, at least some of the revenues from a tax or an auction would likely be 
allocated to repaying government debt. 15 
 
that when the government obtains new general revenue, it tends to finance more spending 
rather than decrease taxes. 
C. Subsidies and Removal of Subsidies 
In this section, we focus primarily on subsidies that directly affect energy use and 
pollution. We do not, for example, examine subsidies for research and development, 
some of which had positive economic effects and others of which had adverse effects.
19
Surprisingly little is known about the overall effect of removing subsidies on 
energy consumption and the environment. There are a number of studies of individual 
subsidies and their impacts, but few studies that aggregate the impacts of different 
subsidies. We think this could be an important area for future research because subsidies 
are widespread, and in some cases, they are known to have adverse effects on both the 
environment and the economy (Victor, 2009). We first summarize the literature that 
addresses overall levels of subsidies, and energy subsidies in particular. Then, we provide 
a brief review of some studies that address the impact of removing subsidies on 
environmental impacts. 
 
A study by van Beers and de Moor (2001) reveals that subsidies are substantial in 
both the OECD and non-OECD countries for the years 1994-1998.
20
The economic, energy and environmental impacts of the various subsidies are not 
well understood and will depend on the design of the subsidy. For example, subsidies that 
encourage production and consumption can be expected to have harmful effects. In 
contrast, “lump-sum” subsidies that are unrelated to specific output or consumption levels 
can be expected to have much smaller impacts on energy use and the environment. 
 The key results are 
presented in Figure 4. Subsidies total over $1 trillion for those years, two-thirds of which 
are in OECD countries. About 40 percent of subsidies go to agriculture (mostly in OECD 
countries), and 20 percent go to energy. 
                                                 
19 For an overview of some of the issues related to subsidizing energy research and development, see Jaffe 
et al. (2005) and Cohen and Noll (1991). 
20 The definition of a subsidy used by van Beers and de Moor is “Subsidies comprise all measures that keep 
prices for consumers below market level or keep prices for producers above market level or that reduce 
costs for consumers and producers by giving direct or indirect support” (van Beers and de Moor, 2000, p. 
4). 16 
 
While not quantified in the van Beers and de Moor study, it appears that a large 
portion of the subsidies are  for areas that could result in significant adverse 
environmental impacts. We conjecture that these subsidies are likely to do more harm 
than good in environmental terms because they will often encourage the use of energy or 
energy-intensive products. 
Some recent work by the International Energy Agency provides insights into the 
allocation of energy subsidies across non-OECD countries. This work defines an 
intervention as a subsidy if it leads to the energy prices that would be below those 
achieved by a free market. So, for example, energy related consumption subsidies would 
fall under this category.  
In 2007, for the 20 non-OECD  countries covered in the International Energy 
Agency analysis, total subsidies for energy were about $310 billion.  Oil is most heavily 
subsidized in the non-OECD countries, accounting for about half of all energy subsidies 
(International Energy Agency, 2008, p. 62). The three non-OECD countries with the 
highest level of energy subsidies were Iran, Russia and China. Together, they account for 
about 47 percent of total energy subsidies in non-OECD countries.
21
To our knowledge, one of the few studies that attempts to synthesize the impacts 
of energy subsidies on the environment was done by David Pearce (2003), who was a 
pioneer in this area.
  
22 Table 2 reproduces some early work by Pearce and adds three more 
recent studies. The table shows that removal of energy subsidies could have substantial 
positive effects in Russia in terms of the impact on both local air pollution and climate 
change. It is likely the economic impacts would be positive as well as the Russian 
economy adjusts to world energy prices. The other studies reviewed in the table show the 
impact of removing various subsidies for energy on the production of carbon dioxide; for 
the cases examined, the impacts are all positive.
23
                                                 
21 A question worth exploring is how the removal of energy subsidies for countries that are likely to be 
significant participants in a climate change agreement, such as India and China, would affect emissions of 
carbon dioxide. 
  
22 OECD (2005) provides an overview of environmental harmful subsidies in the OECD. 
23 It is possible to imagine removal of specific energy subsidies, say for oil or gas, that could result in 
higher levels of carbon dioxide emissions if there were fuel switching to coal. 17 
 
This brief review of subsidies reveals that many do more good than harm in terms 
of their environmental impact. Many also encourage excessive use of particular energy 
sources, such as the consumption of oil in Iran or Russia. More research is needed to 
understand better the aggregate impacts of subsidies on the environment and energy 
security. In addition, more research is needed on the efficiency gains (or losses) 
associated with removing subsidies. 
D. Vehicle Regulation  
This section reviews some important themes in vehicle regulation and examines 
the potential for efficiency improvements. We find that there is evidence that changes in 
regulatory approaches and the choice of regulatory targets could result in large efficiency 
gains. Furthermore, the use of less conventional instruments, such as congestion pricing, 
holds out considerable promise. 
There are numerous automobile externalities, with local and global air pollution, 
congestion and traffic accidents being the most important ones.
24
The damages associated with motor vehicle travel can be substantial.  In the U.S., 
for example, there were about 31 million accidents in 2000, which resulted in about 42 
thousands fatalities and total injury costs of about $433 billion (Parry et al., 2007, p. 
382). Light duty vehicles also account for a fifth of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2006). 
  In all these cases, there 
is a plausible justification for some kind of regulatory or legal action because individuals 
may not otherwise take into account the full social costs of their actions (Coase, 1960; 
Posner, 1973).  
Vehicles are highly regulated in most parts of the developed world, and, 
increasingly in the developing world. Motor fuels, such as gasoline, are also taxed, 
sometimes heavily. Almost all countries have significant taxes on fuel, ranging from 
$.4/gal (US) to $3.5/gal (UK) (Parry et al., 2007). 
                                                 
24 Strictly speaking, these market failures arise only when there are externalities. Thus, for example, if an 
individual has an accident that hurts only himself or his vehicle, but does not increase the risk to someone 
else of having an accident, this should not be counted as an externality. Other externalities include oil 
dependency, noise, highway maintenance costs, urban sprawl, parking subsidies, and improper disposal of 
vehicles (Rothengatter, 2000; Parry et al., 2007). 18 
 
Most countries also have vehicle emission standards. In the U.S., for example, 
there are tailpipe standards that limit the number of grams-per mile of hydrocarbons, 
nitrogen oxides and carbon monoxide for new vehicles. Those standards have been 
significantly tightened since their introduction in the 1970 Clean Air Act and will 
eventually limit new vehicle emission rates to between 0.8-5.0 percent of their pre-1970 
rates (Parry et al., 2007). An ex-post study of the Clean Air Act from 1970-1990 by the 
EPA suggest that benefits exceeded costs with a very high probability (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 1997).
25
Fuel economy standards for vehicles are popular in a number of developed 
countries, such as the U.S. and many member countries of the European Union. The U.S. 
has set its standard for cars at 27.5 miles per gallon since the mid 80s. Light duty fuel 
economy standards have recently been revised so that they will gradually reach 35 miles 
per gallon by 2016. Economists have sometimes been critical of fuel economy standards 
because they can have some pernicious effects. For example, they raise the price of new 
vehicles, thus encouraging people to hold on to their older cars longer, which typically 
pollute more (Gruenspecht, 1982). Fuel economy standards also lower the cost per mile 
of driving.    
 The European Union has similar legislation, 
and many developing countries model their standards after the U.S. or EU (Timilsina and 
Dulal, 2009). Enforcement of standards varies across regions and countries. In 
developing countries, enforcement is often relatively weak due to the lack of resources 
(Timilsina and Dulal, 2009). 
There is much  evidence that fuel economy standards are not cost-effective 
compared with other approaches,  such as gasoline taxes  (see Table 3). For example 
Austin and Dinan (2005) find that the costs of reducing fuel consumption by 10% can be 
achieved with a gas tax at roughly 35% of the costs of comparable CAFE standards. Kleit 
(2004) finds that the costs of achieving energy savings from tightening CAFE standard 
by 3 miles per gallon are 14 times as great as those associated with a gas tax that achieves 
comparable energy savings. West and Williams (2005) argue that distortions created by 
                                                 
25  Note that the EPA study does not explicitly calculate benefits  from tighter emission standards for 
automobiles, but only provides aggregate estimates for mobile and stationary sources. The magnitudes 
suggest that the regulation of mobile sources by itself would have passed a benefit-cost test (Parry et al., 
2007).  19 
 
existing taxes on labor further increase the attractiveness of gas taxes over CAFE. They 
estimate that these distortions increase the marginal cost  of CAFE by about 60% 
compared with a situation with no preexisting labor taxes. 
Gas taxes are a better instrument than fuel economy standards for reducing energy 
consumption in large part because gas taxes directly discourage fuel use by raising the 
price. However, gas taxes are rarely set to maximize welfare gains with respect to various 
energy and environmental externalities (see Table 3). Parry and Small (2005) find that 
increasing U.S. gas taxes from $.40/gal to $1/gal would yield welfare gains equal to 7.4% 
of initial pre-tax fuel expenditures; decreasing UK gas taxes from $2.8/gal to $1.34/gal 
would yield welfare gain equal to 23% of pre-tax gasoline expenditures.  
Gas taxes are not without their problems. In particular, they are an imperfect 
mechanism for addressing local air pollution externalities, traffic congestion and 
accidents, which are all more closely related to miles driven than to the amount of fuel 
used. Estimates of the externalities related to miles driven suggest that they are an order 
of magnitude higher than externalities related directly to fuel use, mainly greenhouse gas 
emissions (Parry, 2005). Researchers have examined a number of other instruments that 
could be used to increase efficiency significantly. These include taxes on vehicle miles 
traveled, pay as you drive insurance, and congestion charges. 
Both taxes on vehicle miles traveled and pay as you drive insurance are motivated 
by the observation that externalities related to miles driven are quantitatively larger than 
externalities related to fuel use (Parry, 2005). Parry and Small (2005) analyze whether a 
fuel tax or a tax on vehicle miles traveled would achieve higher net benefits. They find 
that a tax on vehicle miles traveled yields much higher benefits for the U.S. and the UK, 
equivalent to an increase in welfare of about 27 percent of  pre-tax gas expenditures in 
the respective countries (Parry and Small, 2005, p. 1285). An adjusted insurance system 
for automobiles could have a similar effect to a tax on vehicle miles traveled, but might 
face less political resistance. In such a scheme the current lump sum insurance premiums 
would be replaced by rates that depend on miles driven and other characteristics of 
drivers, such as age, crash record and region of residence. Parry (2005) estimates welfare 20 
 
gains of using this modified insurance would be much larger than welfare gains from an 
increase in the gasoline tax. It might also face less political resistance. 
Another innovative policy instrument is congestion charges, which have  been 
implemented in London and Singapore. In these cities, driving through designated areas 
is subject to a charge. The congestion charge in London is deemed to be a success today, 
both in terms of its effect on traffic within the designated areas and  economic welfare. 
Vehicle miles driven within the designated areas was reduced by 12 percent in the first 
year alone (Leape, 2006, p. 165). A preliminary assessment of the social costs and 
benefits of the charge suggests annual net benefits of 67 million GBP in 2005 prices 
(Leape, 2006, p. 172). At the same time, the London scheme is fairly simple. For 
example, it does not change prices based on real-time congestion data, something that is 
currently being investigated in Singapore (Belson, 2008).  
This brief review of vehicle regulation suggests that there is great potential for 
efficiency gains. We think it is fair to say that the lessons from environmental and 
resource economics have had less of an impact in this area than in the regulation of 
pollution from stationary sources, such as power plants. 
3. Implementing More Efficient Environmental and Energy policy 
The previous review of policies suggested that many energy and environmental 
policies are not economically efficient, though some improve on efficiency relative to the 
status quo. This is not terribly surprising, given that politics plays a large role in policy 
choice and economic efficiency is not widely accepted as an overarching objective for 
particular policies. Still, we think it is worth exploring  how to make policies more 
economically efficient in the real world. The reason is that more efficient policies will 
generally expand the size of the economic pie. This larger pie can then, in theory, be 
distributed in ways that make many segments of the population better off.  
We focus on two key factors affecting the implementation of more efficient 
policy. One is politics and the second is ideas. In general politics constrains the choice set 
in ways that reduce efficiency. In contrast, ideas can expand the choice set in ways that 
sometimes promote efficiency. Finally, we consider some factors that could promote the 
development of more efficient environmental and energy policies. 21 
 
A. Politics Affects Policy  
Economists and political scientists rely heavily on interest group theory to help 
explain why and how regulatory policies are promulgated. They also rely on theories of 
voting that emphasize the importance of the median voter (Downs, 1957). Noll (1999) 
summarizes some key aspects of interest group theory. The basic idea is that regulation is 
used primarily as a mechanism for transferring benefits from groups that are less 
politically powerful to those that are more powerful. The extent to which particular 
interest groups influence the political process is  affected by the expected costs and 
benefits from organizing politically and the distribution of those benefits across groups 
and within groups (Olson, 1971). Many groups may find it difficult to organize because 
of problems with free-riding.  
Reform is supposed to take place when there are changes in the relative costs and 
benefits of regulation, or when the relative influence of interest groups changes (see, e.g., 
Becker, 1983). The capture theory of regulation, put forward by some economists and 
political scientists, represents a case where the benefits to one interest group are 
concentrated (e.g., the trucking industry), and the costs to the public at large are diffuse 
(Bernstein, 1955; Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976).
26
Keohane, Revesz and Stavins (1998) use elements of political economy theory to 
suggest a general theory of instrument choice for the environment (see also Buchanan 
and Tullock, 1975; Dietz and Vollebergh, 2002). They suggest that there is a supply and 
demand for different policy instruments. Legislators supply political support for different 
instruments, which meets the demands of different interest groups and voters. 
 Interest group theory explains some 
regulatory situations well, particularly when certain industries are protected. It does less 
well in explaining certain kinds of deregulation, such as the deregulation of the airlines 
(Levine, 1987).  
The theories used to examine the political economy of regulation are not always 
very clear about when more efficient policies are likely to emerge. However, interest 
group theory can be applied in different settings to develop some useful insights. For 
                                                 
26 There may also be asymmetries in information between the concentrated group and the public; the latter 
often is not aware of the costs of an intervention, while the former might have very detailed knowledge 
about the cost of regulation that is specific to its area of operation. 22 
 
example, in an environment where politicians have less room to maneuver on fiscal 
policy, we can expect to see more regulation as a substitute. As regulation becomes more 
pervasive and unwieldy, it presents an opportunity for powerful groups adversely affected 
by regulation to try to change the status quo (Becker, 1983; Noll, 1999). Whether such 
regulation will be efficient in an economic sense, or more efficient than current policy, is 
not completely clear. As discussed below, economic analysis can help move the process 
toward more efficient outcomes by highlighting inefficiencies in particular regulations 
and processes, and designing more efficient alternatives. 
General theories of political economy have been applied to show why certain 
inefficient elements of environmental and energy policy persist. For example, Ackerman 
and Hassler (1981) explain how Congress used the legislative process to protect certain 
constituencies. In particular, they argue that both the economy and environment were 
losers as a result of the highly prescriptive 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, which 
required that new power plants install scrubbers to help protect certain coal mining jobs. 
The theme of regulating new sources more stringently than existing sources has been 
persistent in environmental policy, even though there is little or no economic 
justification. When allowance trading was introduced in 1990 to reduce sulfur dioxide 
emissions, the more stringent regulation of new sources was not relaxed, even though it 
would not have affected the overall level of sulfur dioxide emissions. 
A good example of how politics can influence the process of designing 
environmental policy is illustrated by recent U.S. efforts to address climate change using 
marketable permits. A key hope of President Obama’s initial budget proposal had been to 
generate significant revenues from auctioning CO2  emission permits (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2009, p. 21). The Waxman-Markey bill (H.R.  2454)  that 
ultimately passed the House of Representatives substantially reduced the revenue 
generated by allocating large fractions of the permits for free to various entities. This 
reflected the political reality that more political support for the bill could be garnered by 
giving the permits away to preferred constituencies in the early years (Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change, 2009). In addition, the bill contains some highly regulatory 
features that will unnecessarily increase costs (Schoenbrod and Stewart, 2009; Stavins, 
2009). 23 
 
There are three key points to be gleaned from this example related to equity and 
efficiency. First, the marketable permit approach for addressing climate change seems to 
be popular, in part, because politicians have some control over defining winners and 
losers from such a policy. Second, it appears that the President and the House of 
Representatives have different preferences regarding equity and efficiency. In this case, 
the President appears to have been more supportive of auctions than the House, perhaps 
because of a greater concern with deficits. Third, the House bill reveals that distributing 
permits is only one way of making trade-offs between equity and efficiency. Direct 
regulation is also important.
27
B. Ideas Matter 
 
More than a half century ago, Richard Weaver wrote a book entitled Ideas Have 
Consequences (Weaver, 1948). Weaver was right. Think of some of the more influential 
economic thinkers ranging such as Smith, Marx, Keynes and Friedman. Keynes, in fact, 
stated that “...Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist” (Keynes, 1964, 
p. 383). 
George Stigler, an economics Nobel laureate, argued that a fundamental problem 
for economists is that they did not do enough applied benefit-cost analysis of different 
policy alternatives. He believed that a key impediment to getting more economically 
efficient policies selected was that policy makers did not have the information they 
needed to make economically efficient choices. Give them more and better information 
and one could expect more efficient policy choices (Stigler, 1965). A somewhat older and 
wiser Stigler modified his earlier view in an article entitled “The Theory of Economic 
Regulation” (Stigler, 1971).
28
A key insight from the literature on ideas is that they affect general policy 
choices. We see this very clearly in the areas of energy policy and environmental policy. 
Consider the now-conventional policy tools of benefit-cost analysis and marketable 
 
                                                 
27 It remains to be seen where whether climate legislation will pass in the US anytime soon. 
28 This article relied on interest group theory to suggest why many aspects of regulation are likely to be 
“captured” by well-organized interest groups. 24 
 
permits. Both of these tools have been used frequently during the last two decades. In the 
case of benefit-cost analysis, it is now performed routinely for all major environmental, 
health and safety regulation in the United States (Hahn and Tetlock, 2008). Cass 
Sunstein, for example, has argued that we now live in a “cost-benefit state” (Sunstein, 
2002). 
In the case of marketable permits, they were embraced in the 1990 Clean Air Act 
amendments in the allowance trading program aimed at reducing sulfur dioxide (Stavins, 
1998). There have also been a number of other applications including the trading of water 
rights in selected regions, and the trading of leads credit to reduce the lead content in 
gasoline.
29 To see precisely how ideas matter, it is instructive to consider the case of 
marketable permits for controlling pollution in more detail. Early researchers made two 
important points. First, that it is, in principle, possible to design a system of marketable 
permits that achieved any particular target at least cost (e.g., Crocker, 1966; Dales, 1968). 
This result depended on a number of factors, including measurement of the particular 
input or output, such as pollution, and a linear (or monotonic) relationship between 
pollution and damages (Montgomery, 1972).  The second point was that the distribution 
of property rights would not impair the achievement of an efficient result under certain 
conditions. Indeed, this was one of the key insights in Coase’s famous article, “The 
Problem of Social Cost” (1960).
30
The idea of marketable permits took decades to move from the ivory tower and 
the classroom into practice. Students, some of whom later became key decision makers, 
were taught these ideas in undergraduate and graduate economics courses. This teaching 
provided a pathway for the diffusion of the ideas.  
  
Economists continued to work on the theory and also explored how these 
concepts can and do work in practice (Tietenberg, 2006). Some applications did not work 
well, partly for political reasons. For example, early experience with market-based 
approaches in the United States led to uneasy compromises, which in some cases 
                                                 
29 For a more detailed overview of various approaches, see Stavins (2003). 
30 This insight was particularly important for politicians making decisions about transferring wealth among 
groups and individuals. It allowed them to design a program where they could exert control over the 
distributional outcome while still promoting efficiency. 25 
 
sacrificed both cost savings and environmental quality (Liroff, 1980). Still, politicians, 
policy makers, and academics appear to have learned from these experiences.  
The allowance trading scheme for sulfur dioxide, while not perfect in design or 
execution, represents a major advance over some of the earlier trading schemes. It also 
provides some important lessons for the design of a marketable permit system for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Stavins, 1998). The trading scheme came into being, 
in part, because politicians could decide who received the revenues from the permits. 
They could also tailor the law in ways that made it more politically palatable, such as 
continuing to regulate new sources more stringently than old sources. 
While the politics are somewhat different because greenhouse gas emissions are a 
global problem, the attractiveness of the idea is similar. It can allow politicians to address 
some difficult distributional issues in a more efficient manner (Stavins, 2007). 
In summary, new ideas in the form of policy tools and new policy designs have 
the  potential  to improve efficiency greatly in energy and environmental policy. In 
addition, the demonstrated effectiveness of these ideas can affect their diffusion. But 
new, more efficient, policy designs are not in themselves sufficient for generating better 
policies because of constraints imposed by politics and the administrative process. 
C. Factors that Could Help Contribute to More Efficient Policy 
Academics, and economists in particular, can pursue both research and advocacy 
if they are interested in promoting more efficient policies. We suggest three ways in 
which research can promote efficiency: analyzing the benefits and costs of different 
policies, designing mechanisms for improving efficiency by improving information and 
changing the political landscape, and analyzing winning strategies that are likely to 
improve economic efficiency. In addition, we highlight the role that education  and 
advocacy can play in promoting efficiency. The factors we identify are meant to address 
causes of government failure mentioned above–namely, that decision makers may not 
wish to pursue efficient policies, or they may not have access to good information. 
Investigating the benefits and costs of different policies. For a decade, one of the 
authors (Hahn) ran a center aimed at holding regulators and lawmakers more accountable 26 
 
by doing both ex-ante and ex-post benefit-cost analysis of important regulatory issues. 
Such work is generally not glamorous and does not typically have a high payoff for 
academics because it rarely breaks new theoretical ground. It can, however, raise the cost 
to politicians and regulators of pursuing inefficient regulations by making these costs 
more transparent. We believe that more of this research should be encouraged by 
foundations, governments and the private sector. 
Designing better tools for promoting efficiency. There has been, and continues to 
be major improvements in research in our understanding of how different economic 
instruments operate. For example, economists now have a deeper appreciation for how 
the use of revenues from a tax or permit system can affect the efficiency of that system 
(Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996). They also have a better understanding of how to design 
auction systems that are likely to work well for different kinds of problems (Klemperer, 
2004). Furthermore, as noted above, there are refinements being made in our ability to 
measure different kinds of damages that could enhance the design of regulatory systems 
(Muller and Mendelsohn, forthcoming). These advances should be encouraged, as they 
can have great practical value. 
Law and economics scholars should also continue to investigate changes in the 
regulatory process that could help promote efficiency (e.g., Breyer, 1995). One major 
change that was implemented about three decades ago was to centralize regulatory 
oversight in the U.S. Over time, that regulatory process has become more transparent. 
Still, this transparency could be improved with standardized summaries of regulatory 
impact analyses.  
In addition, there are concerns that such analyses may be compromised because 
they may not be independent; in some cases, the analysis may be “captured” by particular 
interests (Flyvbjerg, forthcoming). For example, if a regulatory agency wished to pursue 
a particular agenda, it may tailor its analysis to support that agenda. An alternative might 
be to have an independent agency, or independent analysts, perform the analysis. 
Developing and assessing the impact of such process changes is an important area where 
social scientists can contribute. 27 
 
Helping to identify a winning strategy for enhancing efficiency. Any policy aimed 
at improving economic efficiency needs to be politically feasible to be implemented. 
Thus, it helps to understand the political forces that are likely to block such policy 
proposals and what it will take to effectively overcome those forces. Economists can help 
address this problem in two distinct ways. One is to understand the particular political 
motivation of different legislators. For example, a recent study by Cragg and Kahn 
(2009)  suggests that conservative, poor areas have higher per-capita emissions than 
liberal, richer areas. They also show that representatives from these areas have a lower 
probability of voting for legislation that reduces carbon emissions.  
Another  way economists can help is by estimating what it will take to make 
certain interest groups at least as well off as they are under the status quo. There is a 
growing, literature, for example, that looks at the fraction of permits that needs to be 
allocated to industry in general, or specific industries, to make them at least as well of 
under the new regulatory regime as the status quo. This literature recognizes that 
distributing the permits for free can help buy the support of some key industries that 
otherwise might oppose the economic instrument. Allocating all permits for free, 
however, would likely overcompensate the regulated sector, creating large windfall 
profits for firms, such as occurred in the first phase of the EU ETS (Hepburn et al., 
2006). Goulder et al. (2009) find that roughly 13 percent of freely allocated emission 
allowances would compensate firms under a cap-and-trade program in a profit neutral 
way for a emissions cap profile that matches the proposed Waxman-Markey bill. Burtraw 
and Palmer (2008) find that the U.S. electricity sector would require only 6 percent of the 
total value of allowances to be at least as well off under regulation.  
This literature is particularly important in light of government’s increasing 
interest in trying to keep the revenues from marketable permits to address budgetary 
shortfalls. As noted above, in the case of U.S. climate policy, it is unclear to which extent 
permits will be auctioned if a climate bill eventually becomes law. The nature of the 
actual revenue flows from economic instruments should be taken into account by 
academics and policy makers in the design of feasible and efficient instruments. Hahn 
(2009) notes that revenues from environmental taxes and auction revenues from permits 
are often allocated inefficiently, and such inefficiencies could arise in future applications. 28 
 
Reducing  costs to voters of becoming informed. As Downs pointed out many 
years ago, voters quite rationally remain uninformed about many issues given the high 
cost of becoming informed (Downs, 1957). Many of the issues related to more efficient 
policy design are highly technical, and some require a fair amount of economics.  
Economists could help reduce the cost to voters by making economics more 
accessible to both students at the high school and college levels. If the average voter 
understood basic concepts related to economics, such as opportunity cost and no-free 
lunch, it would be easier for them to appreciate the importance of considering economic 
efficiency in the design of policy.  
Economists could also promote a more informed discussion by making some of 
their writing and arguments more accessible to the public. Journals, such as the 
Economists’ Voice, have been helpful in this regard, but there is still little professional 
payoff to academic economists for engaging in this activity.  
Finally, where there is consensus among economists on the importance of using 
tools like benefit-cost analysis and marketable permits, this consensus should be 
effectively communicated to interested elites and the public at large. One way of doing 
this is through issuing jointly authored documents that are published in accessible places 
(e.g., Arrow et al., 1996; Arrow et al., 2008; Walker et al., 2009). 
Lobbying for efficiency. Years ago, Steven Kelman wrote a wonderful book about 
the lack of understanding of how pollution taxes actually work among Capitol Hill 
staffers  (Kelman, 1981). In that book, he argued that economists who endorse such 
approaches need to become “lobbyists for efficiency” if they wish to see their ideas put 
into practice. 
We believe Kelman was right. Many academic economists are not comfortable 
with this idea because they feel it is either beneath them or may sacrifice their academic 
objectivity. While we understand their views, we believe that people should stand up for 
what they believe in. For example, if economists believe that benefit-cost analysis should 
be more widely used, they might want to consider endorsing mechanisms that allow for 
the more widespread use of such analysis. One such mechanism is a requirement that 
benefit-cost analysis of regulations be reviewable in a court of law.  29 
 
Economists might also want to market their views on the importance of using 
good economic analysis to politicians who are more likely to be supportive–most notably 
national presidents and prime ministers. These officials, who represent large and broad 
constituencies, are more likely to take a societal perspective than politicians who 
represent narrower constituencies. 
Economists should also be prepared to seize the moment when it arises to trumpet 
the findings of their analysis for purposes of policy design. Ethanol provides a good 
example. Many economists have suggested that corn-based ethanol should not be 
subsidized or protected from imports  (Wolak, 2007). The main reason is that such 
support is not justified on benefit-cost grounds. When interest groups, such as beef 
producers, are adversely affected by government support for corn growers, this situation 
may present an opportunity to advance policies that increase economic efficiency in this 
area.  
There are two general points here. First, it is difficult to predict when a benefit-
cost analysis of something like ethanol will be policy relevant. Second, when the issue 
does become salient, academic economists can help by taking on lobbying for efficiency. 
4. Conclusion and Areas for Future Research 
This paper provided a selective review of the economics and political science 
literature on energy and environmental policy. We focused primarily on regulatory 
policies, mostly in developed countries. We found that many energy and environmental 
policies likely do more good than harm, but many do not. Furthermore, many of these 
policies do not come close to maximizing net  economic  benefits. A review of the 
literature in political economy provided compelling reasons for why energy and 
environmental regulation is rarely efficient.  
Economists have already had some impact on energy and environmental policy. 
Examples include the development and implementation of benefit-cost analysis and the 
market-based approaches for environmental protection. We suggested a number of ways 
that economists might facilitate the implementation of more efficient energy and 
environmental policies in the future. These included doing more analysis of the benefits 
and costs of different policies, designing better tools for promoting efficiency, reducing 30 
 
the costs to voters of becoming informed, and lobbying for efficiency. Political scientists 
and economists could also help identify approaches that would be politically feasible in 
designing more efficient policies. 
While perhaps less apparent, economists have had an important impact on 
framing parts of the climate change debate. Economic modeling has provided insight into 
setting reasonable goals for climate policy, efficient means for achieving particular goals, 
and the design of mechanisms for achieving the goals that may be politically feasible. 
Clearly, much more needs to be done in designing and implementing sensible policies, 
but economists continue to have an impact. 
There are several areas that could benefit  from research. First, our review of 
subsidies suggested that little is known about the overall effect of removing subsidies 
related to energy and the environment. Research in this area may motivate some decision 
makers to take a closer look at the economic and social impacts of various subsidies. 
Second, our analysis does not cover the impact of various regulatory instruments on 
innovation. Innovation is an important driver of economic welfare, and understanding 
better how various forms of regulation affect energy and environmental innovation is 
important (see, e.g., Popp, 2002). Third, most research covers the U.S., and to a lesser 
extent, Europe. More research on other areas of the world would be useful. Finally, it 
would be valuable to have a more complete theory about the conditions under which 
more efficient policies will emerge in the energy and environmental arenas. Political 
economy provides some general guidance, but we know little about the specifics of what 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Estimates of the Total Annual Benefits and Costs of Major Federal Regulations:  




Source: Based on OMB (2008, p. 4, Table 1-1) 
 
Notes: The OMB report only provides ranges, which are shown as error bars in the chart. 
We took the mean of the range for the central values. Note that horizontal axis uses a 




Figure 2: Cost Effectiveness of Safety, Toxin Control and Other Regulation. Cost per 













Source: Tietenberg (2006, pp. 58-59) 
 
Notes: If there were more than on study, the green bar shows the mean of all studies and 
the error bars show the minimum and maximum value.  
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Table 1: Ex-post Studies of Marketable Permit Programs 
 
Study  Details  Impact estimate 
US SO2 trading program – cost savings 
Carlson et al. (2000)
a  Compared to command and 
control regime 
1995: -$42 M 
1996: -$184 M 
Ellerman et al. (2000)
b  Compared to command and 
control regime 
1995-9: $506 M per year 
Keohane (2006)
c  Compared to command and 
control regime 
1995-9: $216-259 M per year 
Compared to scrubber regime  1995-9: $2554 M per year 
EU Emission Trading System – emission reductions 
Ellerman and Buchner 
(2008)
d 
EU ETS covered sectors  2005-6: 




EU power sector  2005: 88 Mton CO2 




EU power sector  2005: 34 Mton CO2 
2006: 19 Mton CO2 
McGuinness and Ellerman 
(2008)
g 
UK power sector  2005: 13-21 Mton CO2 
2006: 14-21 Mton CO2 
Ellerman and Feilhauer 
(2008)
h 
German power sector  2005-7: 13-57 Mton CO2 per 
year 
 
Notes: All prices are in 2008 dollars. 
 
a Based on econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost curves and cost 
minimizing assumption 
b Based on a calibrated model 
c Based on econometrically estimated model of abatement choices of electric utilities 
d Based on trend extrapolation of real GDP growth and rate of decline in CO2 intensity 
e Based on simulation with the E-Simulate model 
f Based on simulation with E-Simulate model that was calibrated to observed data from 
2003 and 2004 
g Based on econometrically estimated model of fuel switching behavior 
h Upper bound based on trend extrapolation of real GDP growth and rate of decline in 




Table 2: Environmental Effects of Subsidies  
 
Study  Nature of scenario  Environmental impacts 
Cristofaro et al. (1995) 
US 
Removal of USD 8.5 billion 
energy subsidies 
-10 mtC by 2010 
-37 mtC by 2035 
Removal of USD 15.4 billion 
energy subsidies 
-64 mtC by 2010 
Gurvich et al. (1995) 
Russia 
Removal of energy subsidies 
(effects in 2010) 
76% reduction in TSP 
39% reduction in CO2 
43% reduction in NOx 
66% reduction in SOx 
IEA (1999)  Removal of consumer subsidies 
in Russia, China, and six other 
countries 
16% reduction in CO2 
Larsen and Shah (1994)  Removal of world energy 
subsidies of USD 230 billion 
21% reduction in CO2 
GREEN in Michaelis 
(1996b) 
Removal of global subsidies of 
USD 235 billion 
-15 billion tonnes CO2 in 2050 
DRI in Michaelis 
(1996b) 
Removal of coal subsidies in 
Europe and Japan 
-10 to -50 mtCO2 
Van Beers et al. (2002) 
Netherlands 
Milk subsidy implicit in price 
floors 
59.6 to 229.2 kilotonnes CO2 
55,900 to 215,000 hectare of additional 
land use for dairy farming 
Designation of land for 
agricultural use 
1,958 kilotonnes CO2 




Removal of energy 
consumption subsidies in 
transitional and developing 
economies (effects in 2010) 
1.1% reduction in CO2 (world) 
8% reduction in CO2 (transitional 
economies) 
1% increase in CO2 (developed countries) 
Schmid at al. (2007) 
Austria 
Complete decoupling of 
agricultural subsidies from 
specific crops and livestock 
3.5% reduction in methane 
1.1% increase in soil carbon 
sequestration 
3.1% reduction in nitrate from manure 
7.2% reduction in nitrate from fertilizers 
2.8% reduction in nitrogen surplus 
 
Source: Based on Pearce (2003), with three studies added 
Notes: When removing a subsidy, pollution is generally reduced, and this is associated 
with a negative number in the table. Increases in pollution, noted with a positive number, 




Table 3: Economic Impacts of Proposed Changes in Vehicle Regulation  
 
Study  Approach  Estimated Impact 
CAFE 
Austin and Dinan (2005)  Cost saving from implementing a 
10% reduction in gas consumption 
via a tax versus increase in CAFE 




Kleit (2004)  Cost savings from implementing a 3 
MPG decrease in gasoline 
consumption via tax versus CAFÉ 
increase. 
CAFE 14 times 
more expensive 
than a comparable 
gas tax 
West and Williams 
(2005) 
Marginal costs of gas tax in second 
best 
30% lower costs 
than in first best 
Marginal costs of CAFÉ in second 
best 
60% higher than in 
first best 
Improvements to fuel taxes 
Parry and Small (2005)  Increasing current taxes to optimal 
level in US 
Net benefits 
equivalent to 7.4% 
of pre-tax gas 
expenditures  
Decreasing current taxes to optimal 
level in UK 
Net benefits 
equivalent to 
22.7% of pre-tax 
gas expenditures 
Other regulation (VMT, PAYD, congestion charges) 
Parry and Small (2005)  Replacing gas tax with VMT tax in 
U.S. and UK 
Net benefits 
equivalent to about 
27% of pre-tax gas 
expenditures 
Parry (2005)  Achieving a ~10% reduction in fuel 
use via gas tax 
Welfare gains are 
only 32% of doing 
the same via 
PAYD 
Leape (2006)  London congestion charge  Costs: GBP 163  
million 
Benefits: GBP 230 
million 
 
 
 